A decision-theory argument for belief: infinite payoff, finite cost, uncertain evidence. A higher percent means the wager moved you.
About this test
Pascal's Pensées argue that if a certain kind of God might exist, the payoff of belief is infinite and the cost is finite, so prudence can require the bet even when the evidence does not convince you. Later decision theory asks whether infinite utilities break the math, and the many-gods objection asks which infinite payoff you are betting on. Evidentialists say a belief adopted for a payoff is not a belief you should call your own. These items are original. A high score is sympathy with prudential belief. It is not piety, and a low score is not impiety.
Question 1 of 11
What this test asks
If a commitment might have an infinite payoff and only a finite cost, I take that asymmetry seriously even when I am not convinced.
I will not believe, or act as if I believe, without evidence that meets my usual standard.
The many-gods objection weakens the wager for me. I would not know which infinite payoff I was buying.
I could choose practices that might lead me into a belief, if the stakes were high enough.
A belief adopted for a payoff is not a belief I am willing to call mine.
Finite costs in this life are small beside a genuine infinite possibility, in my judgment.
Expected-value reasoning does not belong in questions of faith or ultimate commitment.
I would rather risk a false practice than miss an infinite good.
The wager fails if the probability is not a number I can actually use.
Living as a believer for the sake of the bet is intellectually honest enough for me.
Authenticity outranks a calculated heavenly payoff.
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